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This paper investigates the allocative efficiency of the 
appropriative system of water rights, within the-context of a 
simplified model of a water using industry .  At a long run competitive 
equilibrium for the industry and with a prohibition on the transfer of 
water rights among firms, it is shown that: (1) senior appropriators 
claim and use more water than junior appropriators; (2) senior 
appropriators bear less risk than junior approjiriators; (3) the 
allocation of water and diversion capacitie-6 among firms is inefficient, 
being dominated by an equal sharing among firms. The equal sharing 
allocation, which is Pareto optimal when diversion capacities are 
supplied by a competitive leasing industry, can be achieved under 
the appropriative system if there are coil!petitive markets in water 
rights and in leases for the use of diver�ion capacities, an application 
of the Coase theorem. 
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Historically, water rights to surface water in the United 
States have developed under two distinct legal doctrines -- the 
English common law notion of riparian rights and the appropriative 
doctrine, Generally speaking, the riparian doctrine forms the basis 
for water law in the Eastern states, while the Western states have 
adopted the appropriative doctrine. Under the riparian doctrine, 
each property owner fronting on a lake or stream has a right to the 
unimpaired use of the waterway, regardless of the location o.f his 
property along the waterway and regardless of the time at which the 
property is acquired or use made of the waterway, Consequently, 
rights to water are only unsufructuary: strictly speaking the right 
holder may not diminish the flow of water by physically consuming it 
as this would impair the rights of other riparians, 
In practice the courts have held that "reasonable" diversions 
of water by riparian rights holders are permissible , but there are 
still severe restrictions on such diversions, coupled with uncertainty 
as to how a court will view any specific diversion, As a practical 
matter, the riparian doctrine is especially suited to an environment 
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in which the use of t i 1 d wa er nvo ves no !versions, for example, in the 
use of a stream for fishing, swimming, boating, transportation or power 
generation. 
In contrast, under the appropriative doctrine the right to 
a certain amount of water is established and maintained only through 
use; if there is a lapse in usage or a change in the nature of the 
usage, the right to the water can be lost.1 Moreover, the right 
enables the holder to physically consume the water to which he is 
entitled, provided it is put to a beneficial use. Seniority of rights 
is based on the chronological order in which the right was obtained, 
the earliest user of water along a waterway being the most senior 
rights holder with priorities superior to those of junior rights 
holders. Under the appropriative doctrine, "first in time means 
first in right. " 
The appropriative doctrine was adopted in the West (and 
is spreading to Eastern states as well) because it is well suited to 
the exploitation of a waterway under conditions in which the major 
uses of the waterway involve physical diversions of water, say for 
irrigation or for municipal or industrial uses. There are obvious 
advantages, under such circumstances, to a system of rights based 
on the appropriative doctrine , as discussed in Burness and Quirk 
(1976), Meyers, and Milliman. In particular, an allocation of rights 
based on the appropriative doctrine preserves incentives for investment 
that would be foregone under the riparian scheme because of the common 
property characteristics of water under riparian allocation of rights. 
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This is not to say that the appropriative doctrine is 
without drawbacks from the point of view of economic efficiency. 
For example, inefficiencies can arise under the appropriative doctrine 
when an individual diverts more water than he can presently use 
profitably in order to establish a right to the use of such water in 
the future when the use might be profitable. To protect against this, 
state water laws limit appropriative rights to diversions that qualify 
as "beneficial consumptive use, " thus excluding wasteful types or 
methods of water use. But there are obvious difficulties in establish-
ing that water is being wasted by a rights holder, so that the 
protection afforded by the restriction of appropriations to "beneficial 
2 consumptive use" might be more illusory than real. 
Most of the· allocative problems associated with the 
appropriative doctrine would be eliminated if water rights could be 
freely transferred or sold. But in every state operating under the 
appropriative doctrine, there are limitations on the transfer and 
sale of water rights. The statutes apply with most force to transfers
that involve a change in use or in diversion location, as for example,
in the transfer of a water right from irrigation to industrial or power 
use, or in the transfer of water outside the property limits of the 
3 original rights holder. Moreover, even when restrictions on
intrastate transfers are relatively weak, sale or transfer of a water 
right that involves removal of water to another state is a practical 
impossibility, at least in the western states. 
Independent of these statutory restrictions the appropriative 
doctrine provides an interesting scenario for the analysis of the
efficiency aspects of water allocation. In this paper; we examine 
the efficiency implications of the appropriative doctrine at a long 
run competitive equilibrium under simplified assumptions as to the 
4 legal status of water rights. Brie£ly, our conclusions are the 
following. In the absence of a competitive market for the purchase 
and sale of water rights, the appropriative doctrine leads to an 
inefficient use of water. Inefficiency arises under the appropriative 
doctrine because of the unequal sharing of risks among the users of 
a waterway; senior appropriators bear less risk than junior appropriators. 
As an application of the Coase theorem, the introduction of a competitive 
market in water rights and use of diversion facilities eliminates
allocative inefficiencies. However, increasing returns in the 
construction and maintenance of diversion facilities interferes with 
the establishment of competitive markets in the leasing of diversion
capacity; furthermore, monopoly problems can arise in the market for 
water rights as well. Beyond this, limitations on entry can lead to 
problems associated with a sub-optimal investment in diversion capacity. 
For the special case of a waterway utilized by firms with 
identical production functions, allocative efficiency requires the 
equal sharing of risk (hence water) by all firms • .  But an assignment
of water rights on the basis of equal sharing (a variant of the legal 
doctrine of correlative rights) leads to much the same common property 
problems as the riparian scheme; and similar difficulties arise for 
the case of firms using diverse technologies. Thus, in the absence of 
freely transferrable property rights, the appropriative doctrine leads 
to an allocation of water that is inefficient, but alternative· schemes
for.assigning water rights are generally not incentive compatible with 
a competitive environment. 
I. THE MODEL 
The problems that arise for an efficient allocation of 
water under the appropriative doctrine rest ultimately on the random 
nature of water flows. We consider the case of .a waterway with a 
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flow of x acre feet per year, where x is a random variable with known 
5 probability density function f(x). For simplicity, we ignore the 
autocorrelation of streamflows over time and concentrate instead on 
the characteristics of a steady state situation. We assume that there 
are a number of potential users of the stream and no institutional 
barriers to entry exist, except those associated with the rights of 
senior appropriators. 
Under the appropriative doctrine, rights to water are 
established only through use. In order to use ai units of water each 
th period, the i appropriator must have access to a diversion facility
with a capacity at least equal to ai units. In particular, firm i is
i -assumed to possess a profit function 11 (ai, ai) where a1 is the use of 
water per period by firm i and ai is the capacity of the diversion
< -
. facility owned by firm i, subject to the restriction ai = ai. For 
simplicity we ignore other factors of production although clearly 
substitution of other factors for water could play an important role 
in the production process, particularly for firms with relatively 
junior rights. 
We assume that there is no charge to an appropriator.for 
6 the water he uses, that
i 
lf 
i = l'!I._ >1 - <lai 
i strictly concave in ai' that is 1111
0 for ai �
2 i 
= �<O - 2 .Clai 
i 
O, and that 11 is
Costs incurred in 
production are associated with the construction and maintenance of 
diversion facilities. It islclear that there are certain economies 
of scale associated with facilities such as pipelines and aqueducts; 
We assume that such nonconvexities apply for a certain range, after 
which problems of coordination, etc., overwhelm.the natural economies 
f 1 i 1 th t i = dll
i 
< 0 f - > 0 o sea e. In part cu ar, we assume a 112 - a- , or ai _ , . ai
i a
2 i i 
with 1122 = -� > O, ai < ai, 1122 < 0 for ai > ai· Moreover, in most Clai 
of what follows we will assume that the profit maximizing choices of 
diversion capacities o_ccur in the range ai > af' so that the marginal 
cost of adding diversion capacity is increasing. Finally, it is 
convenient to assume that diversion facilities deteriorate only 
i - d
2
11ithrough aging and not through use, so that 1112 = <lai<lai 
= O. Under 
this assumption the profit function is separable in ai and ai, so that 
1 - i i- i i 
11 (a1,ai) = R (ai) - C (ai), where R and C are the revenue and cost
functions for the ith firm.
O ur primary purpose is to identify the sources of allocative 
inefficiency associated with the appropriative doctrine. These sources 
are most easily identified in the simplest possible setting. Hence our 
approach in the body·of this paper is to examine in detail the special 
case where all appropriators have identical profit functions, with 
each appropriator acting to maxilllize expected profits. Extensions 
of these results to cas es of dissimilar or risk-averse firll!B are noted 
when of interest. 
With this as background we examine the long run equilibrium 
of a waterway being exploited under the system of appropriative rights. 
We label rights holders in order of seniority, with firm one being the 
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most senior rights holder, firm two second in seniority, etc, Clearly, 
in long run equilibrium with known probability density function, f(x), 
no expected profit maximizing firm would acquire a diversion facility 
with capacity in excess of its rights to use water; moreover, rights 
in excess of diversion capacity would not be approved by the state 
rights administrator. Hence ai can be identified as the appropriative 
i 
rights of firm i. As a matter of notation, let Ai = E aj
. Then 
j=l 
Ai denotes the aggregate amounts of claims to water senior to the 
claims of firm i + l; alternatively, Ai is the total amount of 
diversion capacity owned (or leased) by firms 1 through i (A0 O).
Identifying water rights with diversion capacities, the 
assignment of rights under the appropriative doctrine can be 
sununarized in the vector (a1,a2, • •  . , �), where there are N firms 
i exploiting a stream. Expected profits for firm i, E rr,are then given 
by 
(O,ai) + !TrAtx - Ai-l'ai) 
Ai-1 
+ [l - F(Ai)J rr(ai,ai) 
f(x ) dx 
where rri = 7T for i = i, • . •  , N (all firms are identical) and
F(c) -J�(x) dx. Thus, firm i receives zero units of water if 
0 
the streamflow x is no more than enough to satisfy senior claimants; 
the probability that river flows do not exceed Ai-l is F(Ai-l) while 
profits for the i
th firm in this case are rr(O,�i) ,  so that the expected 
value of this outcome is represented by the first term in the expression 
for expected profits. If the flow exceeds senior claims and can be 
handled by firm i's diversion capacity, then expected profits are 
given by the second term in this expression; i.e., expected profits 
are 1T(x - Ai-l' ai) 
times f(x) summed over the interval of river flows
which yield increasing amounts of water to the ith firm. If river 
flow exceeds the capacity of claimants 1 through i, then the ith
firm receives its entire appropriation. The probability of this 
occurance is 1 - F(Ai) and i 
th firm profits are rr(ai ,iii) ,  hence the 
third term in the expression. 
II. WATER RIGHTS AND WATER USAGE: APPROPRIATIVE SYSTEM 
Clearly, senior claimants obtain a preferred position due 
to their priority in access to the streamflow. Let xi denote the 
flow available for use by firm i and let 
probability distribution over this flow. 
i G (xi) denote the cumulative 
i Then G (xi) is given by: 
i G (x -Ai-l) = F(x), Ai-l � x � "''-
Since Aj > Ai for j > i, it follows that 
Gi(b) � �(b) for b � O, j > i 
with strict inequality for b � Ai-l' assuming f(x) > 0 for A1_1 � x � A1• 
Hence the probability distribution of streamflows facing a 
junior appropriator is stochastically dominated (in the sense of first 
degree stochastic dominance) by the distribution facing any senior 
appropriator. Under the assusnption of positive marginal profitability 
of water use (1T1(ak) > O for ak � O, k � i, j) stochastic dominance 
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implies that for any monotonically increasing measurable utility function 
U over profits, E iU(rr) > E jU(rr) , for i < j (see Quirk and Saposnik G G 
or Hadar and Russell). This result can be summarized as follows: 
Proposition 1. Under the appropriative doctrine, the probability 
distribution facing any senior appropriator is unambiguously preferred, 
by any potential user of the waterway, to that facing a junior appropriator. 
To analyze the consequences of the appropriative doctrine 
for the allocation of water among potential users, we consider the 
distribution of rights that would arise under stationary conditions, 
assuming free entry coupled with an abso1ute prohibition on the sale 
or transfer of water rights to other water users or alternative uses. 
Given that senior claims .(al' 
8
2, • • • , ai-l) exist, firm i chooses the 
diversion capacity iii which maximizes the expected utility of profits. 
Assuming that firm i is risk neutral, expected utility maxilnization 
implies expected profit maximization where 
Ai 
F(Ai-l) rr(O,
a
i) + � rr(x-Ai-l' ai) f(x)dx + [1-F(Ai) ]rr(ai, ai) 
Ai-1 
For ai.> 0 we have 
Ai 
F(Ai-l) rr2(0,
a
i) + � n2(x-Ai-l ' ai) f(x) dx 
Ai-1. 
io 
i Under separability of the profit function (rr12 = 0) we can write 
rr1(z, w) = rr1(z) and rr2(z,w) = rr2(w) and the first order condition
reduces to 
0, 
which we write as 
o. 
At a regular maximum of expected profits we have 
< o. 
Observing that 
we have: 
Proposition 2. Given two expected profit maximizing firms with 
identical separable profit functions, the firm with senior rights 
claims a larger quantity of water (constructs a larger diversion 
capacity) than does a firm with junior rights. 
The incentive rationale underlying Proposition 2 is 
obvious since senior firms face preferred probability distributions 
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over streamflows relative to junior firms. Already there is some 
indication of the allocative inefficiency of the appropriative system 
in the absence of a competitive market for water rights. At an 
optimum, firms with identical production and profit functions should 
presumably divert and use identical amounts of water. The appropriative 
system biases the distribution of water use in favor of firms with 
earlier filing dates for water rights over firms filing later in time. 
Proposition 2 generalizes directly when firms are risk-averse 
expected utility maximizers. If firms face different technologies, then 
the ordering of diversion capacities does not generalize. However, 
the intent of the proposition does: fundamentally, the first order 
conditions imply that with all firms operating in competitive output 
markets, jtmior appropriators.are more productive at the margin, in 
the sense that the ratio of marginal revenue to marginal cost increases 
with decreasing seniority. If firms are identical, this implies that 
senior firms appropriate more water. 
An issue of some importance to allocative efficiency of the 
appropriative doctrine is the extent to which the flow of a waterway 
is appropriated. To put it in other term3, how much diversion capacity 
is built under the system of appropriative rights, assuming each firm 
b uilds its own capacity? 
Let N denote the number of appropriators exploiting a 
waterway at a long run competitive equilibrium so that the last firm 
just finds it worthwhile to appropriate a portion of the stream by 
building a diversion capacity. Assuming risk neutrality and separable 
profit functions for all firms, if the waterway is appropriated by 
N firms we have 
where 
0 
From the first order condition we have 
completely appropriated only if aN + 0 with _lim 1T1(aN) = + 00• So 
8N+O 
long as n1 is bounded from above, the total amount of diversionary 
capacity built is less than the maximum flow of the stream. 
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Given a neoclassical production function and a competitive 
output market for the firm's product, then_lim n1(aN) = + 00• This aN-+ 0 
does not necessarily guarantee a completely appropriated stream, 
however. In fact, under extreme conditions of scale economies in
di version capacity, _lim n 2 (aN) = - oo .  We will assume that increasing aN-+ 0 
returns "dominate" for small diversion capacities in the sense that 
lim 
a: ... o 
i 
Under such circumstances, the number of firms exploiting the stream 
is finite, with each firm of noninfinitesmal size. 
Proposition 3, If increasing returns dominate for small diversion· 
capacities and if the potential users of a stream are risk neutral with 
identical separable profit functions, then the aggregate amount of water 
rights (diversiop capacity) at a long run competitive equilibrium is 
less than the maximum flow of the stream; further,. each appropriator is 
7 of non.infinitesmal size, and the number of appropriators is finite. 
Corollary. Under the conditions of Proposition 3, the expected value 
of streamflows exceeds the expected value of diversions.
III. ALLOCATIVE INEFFICIENCY OF THE APPROPRIATIVE SYSTEM
Consider next a waterway operating in long run competitive 
equilibrium, exploited by N risk n.eutral firms with identical separable 
profit functions, with water rights determined under the appropriative 
doctrine. Suppose the conditions of Proposition 3 hold, so that N is
finite. Let (ai, . . , aN) denote the vector of diversion capacities
for the N firms. Associated with this pattern of appropriations is 
a value of aggregate expected profits, EA, given by 
Given �· the diversion capacity under the appropriative system, is the 
pattern of investment in diversion capacity and use of water associated 
with the appropriative system efficient? The answer is that the. 
appropriative system is not efficient. We establish this by showing 
that there exists a feasible alternative to the appropriative system, 
namely equal sharing, that produces a higher value of output for every 
possible strearnflow. 
Given the aggregate diversion capacity � and given any
streamflow x, then aggregate profits associated with an arbitrary 
feasible allocation of diversion capacities and water usage are. given 
hy 
N N N 
E n(ai,ai) where ai < ai, i = 1, • • • , N, E ai � x, E ai � �· �l �l �l 
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It is immediate that with n11 < 0, then so long as n22 < 0 
(marginal cost of adding diversion capacity is increasing), aggregate 
x Au profits are maximized when ai = N for x '.: �· ai = N for x > �· with
- AN for i = 1, N ai - N ' ·  . , · In fact, writing aggregate profits as 
N 
L {R(ai) - C(ai)} it also follows that under equal sharing, i=l 
N N 
aggregate revenue L Ri(ai) is maximized and aggregate cost L C(ai) is �l �l 
minimized, subject to the feasibility constrain�s. Finally, for N > 1, 
aggregate profits (and aggregate revenue) are clearly less under the 
appropriative system than under equal sharing, for any value of x, 
because of the ordering of capacities from Proposition 2. Assuming 
competitive input and output markets, ·the results in turn imply that 
Pareto optimality implies equal sharing, while the appropriative system 
is inefficient. 
Proposition 4. Assume that N firms exploit a watet'Way, with each firm 
having an identical separable profit function strictly concave in water 
usage. If the marginal cost of adding diversion capacity is increasing, 
then equal sharing is the efficient allocation of diversion capacity and 
water_ usage; allocation under the appropriative system is inefficient.8 
The assumption that the marginal cost of adding diversion 
capacity is increasing at an equal sharing allocation is restrictive. 
As it turns out, when this assumption is relaxed to permit declining 
marginal costs of adding diversion capacity, then it can still be shown 
that the appropriative system is inefficient in the sense that expected 
profits under other feasible allocations exceed those under the appropriative 
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system. However, equal sharing is no longer necessarily the efficient 
allocation. Details are given in Appendix A-2. 
The source of the allocative inefficiencies of the 
appropriative system is unequal sharing of risk and diversion 
capacity among firms. The Coase Theorem makes it clear that a 
solution to the problem involves the establishment of competitive 
markets in water rights. Let aij be the fraction of firm i's rights 
that is purchased by firm.j, and let aij be the fraction of firm i's 
diversion capacity leased to firm j; let pi be the price for a one 
percent share of firm i's water and let qi be the price for a one 
percent share of firm i's diversion capacity. Then given the investment 
vector (a1, . .. , �) established under the appropriative allocation 
and assuming risk neutrality, with competitive markets in rights and 
capacity, each firm picks aij 
and aij 
so as to maximize expected
profits. At an equilibrium (see Appendix A.3 for a complete derivation, 
with a =  �/N,-we have 
Ai 
(*) J n1 (�)(x-Ai_1)f(x)dx
Ai-1 
(**) i, j = 1, • • •  , N 
.17 
Condition (*) can be written as 
(* ') 
In (**), qi> qj for i < j ; the price for one percent of a senior firm's 
capacity exceeds that of a junior firm, as the senior firm has larger 
capacity; however, qi/a1 = qj/� for i, j = 1, ... , N, so that price 
per unit of capacity is equal among all firms. Since p1 is the price 
f P1 or one percent of firm i's water rights, 100 x-;::;-- is the price of ai
obtaining one unit of frim i's water when available by streamflow. 
Then the left hand side of (*')(multiplied by 100) is the expected
marginal profitability of a unit of water obtained from firm i, set 
equal to its marginal cost, including the increase in cost due to the 
added diversion capacity necessary to deliver the water. It is 
clear from (*) and (*') that i < j implies pi > pj 
and :i > �, butai aj at the equilibrium prices Pi, i = 1 ,  • • •  , N, purchasers of water are
indifferent among suppliers at the margin.
Clearly conditions (*) and (**) are consistent with market
clearing. Hence an efficient mix of capacities and usages (equal
sharing) can be attained under the appropriative system, given
competitive markets in water rights and diversion capacity and given
a fixed diversion capacity. Thus we have: 
Proposition S. Given that all firms have identical separable profit 
functions and are risk neutral, and given that increasing returns 
dominate for small diversion capacities, the appropriative system of 
rights allocation coupled with competitive markets in rights and 
diversion facilities, leads to an efficient outcome (namely, equal 
sharing), given the fixed aggregate installed diversionary capacity. 
The price per unit of water varies monotonically with the seniority 
of the water supplier; the price per unit of capacity is constant 
across firms •
10
However, there are some problems with the conclusion of 
Proposition 5. Economies of scale in the delivery system for water 
are pervasive enough that it is difficult to maintain a competitive 
environment in the market for diversionary facilities and hence in 
the market for.water rights as well. In fact, it is this phenomenon
that no doubt accounts for the creation of publicly controlled 
irrigation districts in the Southwest, designed to achieve the 
savings from scale while minimizing monopolistic distortions; and 
this also accounts for the (rarely enforced) acreage limitations 
on recipients of water from the Bureau of Reclamation projects. 
Admittedly, in principle monopoly distortions could also be eliminated 
through appropriate bribes, but excessive transactions costs impose 
impediments to such a policy. 
Proposition 5 takes as given the aggregate diversion 
capacity that is built under the appropriative system and asserts 
that competitive markets in rights and in leases of diversion 
facilities lead to an efficient outcome given that diversion capacity. 
This still leaves unanswered the issue of an optimal level of aggregate 
diversion capacity for a waterway. 
We begin by examining a variant of this problem. Suppose that 
each firm owns its own diversion facility, and that increasing returns 
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dominate for small diversion capacities, with N firms exploiting a 
waterway in �ong run equilibrium under the appropriative doctrine. 
Aggregate capacity is � units. Consider in contrast the same N firms 
(all with identical separable profit functions) operating under equal 
sharing of water, with identical diversion capacities. What can be 
said about the amount of capacity that will be installed under equal 
sharing if aggregate expected profits are to be maximized? 
First· order conditions require that 
for the appropriative scheme, while 
n2 <a> + c1- F(Na) Jn1 (ii) 0
for the equal sharing scheme. Thus, 
and 
with 
We have n1 > 0 for ai : 0, n2 < 0 for ai � O, Fµfthgf 1 
assume that all firms operate under nondecreasin� lllP.ratnRi np�t� 
20 
of diversion capacity; in particular, a: aN implies n2(a) : n2(aN).
Suppose that Na : �· But Na : � 
implies a > aN for N > 1. Hence'O < nl(a) < .n1<aN) and 0 > nz(�) > n2(a)
n2(aN) n2(ii) 
O, a contradiction. Hence Na < �·so that�--0> n1 aN n1 a 
Proposition 6. Let N be the number of firms with identical separable 
profit fun�tions exploiting a waterway in long run equilibrium under 
the appropriative system. Then the aggregate diversion capacity
constructed by these N firms exceeds that which would be constructed
by the same firms under equal sharing, assuming that each firm builds
its own diversion facility and that the marginal cost of constructing 
11 diversion facilities is increasing. 
Thus there is a systematic overinvestment in diversion
capacity under the appropriative scheme, assuming the same N firms
exploit a waterway under either equal sharing or the appropriative 
scheme, with each firm building its own diversion capacity. 
IV. A DIVERSION CAPACITY INDUSTRY 
It is clear, however, that with increasing returns operating
with respect to. di version facilities, one would expect the development
21 
of an independent sub-industry engaged in the construction and leasing 
of such facilities. As noted earlier, there are monopolistic problems 
present in such an industry; this has led to the formation of .publicly 
operated and controlled irrigation districts which act in effect as 
lessors of di version capacity. Suppose that the monop.oly problems 
are overcome so that there is competitive pricing of leases. Let 
C(a) denote the annualized cost associated with a diversion facility 
of capacity a. Then under long run competitive conditions, the 
aggregate diversion capacity for a waterway would be equal to fu*, 
where Mis
by any one 
the number of leasing firms and a* is the capacity owned 
� -leasing firm, with a* = C'(a*). That is, each. 
leasing firm builds a capacity such that the average annualized cost 
per unit of capacity is minimized. Under competitive conditions, the 
charge for leasing a unit of capacity would then equal C' (a*). Thus 
lessees would face constant marginal costs of diversion facilities; 
i.e., 7f2(a) = -c' (a*) is a constant independent of a.·
Recall that under the appropriative scheme, 
With a leasing industry operating under competitive condition, we 
have n2(aN) independent of aN. Given that C'(a*)(: - n2(a)) is less than
lim n1 (a,a), it is clear that the "marginal" firm chooses a capacity thata+O . 
approaches zero as N + + 00 • (If C' (a*) > lim n1 (a), then no firm findsa+O 
it profitable to exploit the waterway). It follows that 
1. - lim 
a+O 
C' (a*) 
The same condition holds when aggregate expected profits are 
maximized, with all firms sharing equally in streamflows, since at a 
maximum of aggregate expected pro·fits we have 
so that C' (a*) 
1 - lim 1\ (a) 
a+O· 
Hence � = Na. We summarize this as:
0 
Proposition 7. Suppose there is ?n arbitrary number of firms, all 
with identical separable profit functions, exploiting a waterway. 
In addition suppose there is a competitive industry in diversion 
capacity which leases capacity to rights holders, with each leasing 
firm building the capacity which minimizes the average annualized 
cost per unit of capacity. If entry
.
is free and unobstructed in both 
the diversion capacity and water using ind�stries then in long run 
equilibrium aggregate investment is the same· under either the appropriative
or equal sharing systems.12
Hence, the establishment of a competitive leasing industry 
that takes full advantage of the economics of scale in diversion 
facilities leads. to the same aggregate diversion capacities Wlder 
h 13 t e appropriative· scheme as under equal sharing. 
From Proposition 4 we know that for any given diversion
capacity, equal sharing is the efficient solution given competitive
markets with aggregate profits and revenue larger for any value of
stream flows x than under the appropriative system. Thus with a 
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competitive leasing industry operating to capture the limited economies 
of scale in building diversion capacity, equal sharing is a necessary 
condition for Pareto optimality, and involves the same aggregate 
diversion capacity as the appropriative system. Finally, the equal 
sharing allocation can be achieved under an appropr+ative system by 
competitive markets in water rights, from Proposition 5, By employing 
L'Hospital's rule we have 
lim NR{-�) = aR1(0),N+oo 
so that the aggregate revenue function for equal· sharing is continous 
at the origin. By a limiting argument we have 
Proposition 8. Under the conditions of Proposition 7, at a long
run equilibrium equal sharing is a necessary condition for Pareto 
optimality and equal sharing can be achieved under an appropriative 
system through competitive markets in water rights. 
The appropriative system possesses one fundamental advantage 
over the riparian system or the equal sharing of rights in that it 
provides tenure certainty for each rights holder: rights holders are in 
principle protected against loss of their rights through the legal actions 
of others. While t.he appearance of a new claimant to water can dilute the 
privileges of existing water users under either the riparian pr equal sharing 
systems, the principle of "first in time means first in right" protects 
the privileges of existing users under the appropriative system. 
Unfortunately in practice tenure certainty is difficult to 
guarantee.even under the appropriative system. Due to spatial dispersion 
of appropriators, informational inadequacies and random elements (such 
as variability in return flows) , it is often difficult to determine 
whether a diminished downstream flow to senior appropriators is the 
result of the stochastic nature of river flows or the improper actions 
o f  upstream junior appropriators. And, as we have seen, the principle 
of tenure certainty is bought at the cost of economic efficiency, so 
long as water rights are not freely transferable, 
Limitations on the transferability of water rights exist in 
the form of federal and state statutes and interregional and interstate 
compacts. Moreover, there are other impediments to transfers: fixed 
diversion capacities, transactions costs, and externalities. 
Externalities arise because a change in the nature or location of 
water diversions can affect return flows to a river and hence can 
impinge on the established water rights of third parties, Thus there 
are sound economic grounds for certain of the existing limitations on 
1 rights transfers. 
! 
However, we would argue that considerable potential latitude 
for the transfer of water rights still exists, and that economic 
efficiency could be improved by weakening existing legal constraints 
on such transfers. The usual argument in favor of transferable water 
rights identifies the higher productivity of water in industrial or 
municipal use as compared to present usage which is highly concentrated 
in irrigated farming. While· we certainly agree with this argument, 
our conclusion goes even further; even among identical firms producing 
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identical products, freely transferable water rights leads to increased 
economic efficiency. 
Our approach in this paper has centered in on the simple 
case of a static long run competitive equlibrium with an uncontrolled 
river. We have not attempted to model the dynamics of the process by 
which rights are acquired and implemented under the appropriative 
system, nor have we examined the special problems that arise when a 
reservoir system is constructed with releases to downstream users 
being determined in an optitool fashion·, subject to the priorities that 
15 
hold under the appropriative system of rights. It is clear to us, 
however, that whatever are the complexities introduced into the analysi� 
by these factors, there are still advantages that can be gained by 
widening the possibilities for transferability of water rights. 
APPENDIX 
A.l 
Proposition 3 generalizes immediately for nonidentical 
firms as no comparisons are made across firms. The result generalizes 
as well for risk averse producers . • •  in fact even for nonidentical 
firms with nonidentical utility functions, given monotone preferences 
and risk aversion. 
To see this first observe that first order conditions for 
expected utility maximization require that 
i subject to E u(�)� u(O). Suppose the last appropriator chooses capacity 
aN = 0
, satisfying the first order condition as an equality. Then for any 
This conflicts with the assumption that increasing returns dominates for 
small diversion capacities, Hence 8N is non-infinitesimal and N is finite. 
If the entire river is appropriated these first order conditions become 
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0 
which is impossible in view of the negativity of n2. Hence the river 
is not fully appropriated. 
A . 2 
Consider an arbitrary reassignment of diversion capacities 
and water rights among the N firms such that firm j receives f3j percent
of � as its diversion capacity along with aij percent of any streamflow
within the range Ai-l to Ai where
1, · i,j=l, . . • ,N. 
Let a =  [aij], B = [8j] and let E(a,8) be the expected value of aggregate
profits, where 
N N 
E(a,8) E {E 
j=l i=l 
Ai
J n [aij (x-Ai-l)
Ai-1
+ [1-F(A )]N 
Thus 
i-1 
+ E a kj3tc• BJ.�]f(x)dxk=l 
-E(a 13) E(a,s> A
aj E for -13 j = �. 1, aij = O, i � j,
Let 
At 
i, j = 1, '!!I ij' 
N N N 
L = E(a,8) + ;\(l - E 8 
j
) + E \Ji (1 - E aij)j=l i=l j=l 
a constrained maximum of E(a, 8) we have 
ClE (a , 8) 
aa sr
;\ < O r = 1, • • •  , N (<O implies Br 0)
- µs ::._ 0 s, r=l , ... ,N (<O implies asr 0) 
where, given n12 = O,
A 
ClE (a,8) 
aa sr
J s n1 [a (x-A 1)sr s-
As-1 
N At
+ E J n1[a (x-A 1)t=s+l tr t-
At-1
r=l,
' 
. • .  ,N 
s-1 
+ r akr ak ](x-As-l)f(x)dxk .. l 
as f(x)dx
r,s=l, • • •  ,N
The question we pose is whether the appropriative system
(a,B) qualifies as a candidate for a maximizer of E(a,a). Evaluate
the expression immediately above at ass = 
1, a8r = O, s I r,
a r Br = �· r, s = 1, • • •  , N so that, for s = 1, • • •  , N, 
ClE(a,fi) 
aa 
SS 
AsJ n1 (x - A8_1)(x-A8_1)f(x)dx
As-1
� 
+ Jill
A s 
r-1 
+ E 
t=s+l 
+ 
<a ) a f(x)dx = µs' since a > O; s s SS 
A s 
aE �a.s) �J ll1(0)(x-As_1)f(x)dxaa sr
A s-1
At A J7T1 (O)as f(x)dx + f ll: (x-Ar-l)as
At-1 A r-1
f(x)dx < µ for r > s. - s 
f(x)dx 
But r > s, E(a,B) E � implies a < a by Proposition 2,r s 
and rr1(ai) decreasing in ai implies, on a term by term basis, that
aE (a, B) 
aa sr
> aE (a,B) aa 
SS 
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This contradicts the first order conditions, hence the appropriative 
allocation is nonoptimal. 
Given competitive markets in water rights and diversion 
facilities, each firm solves the problem 
i-1 
+ E akj
�'a
J
Jf(x)dx
k=l 
subject to 
N N 
E a a < E Bij
a
i ij i ,. i=l i=l 
with first order conditions 
N 
A J �l[arj(x-Ar-1)+ E r=i+l 
Ar-1
for aij > O, i=1, . . . , N 
for Bij 
> O, i = 1, • • •  , N, where >.
j 
is the multiplier associated with
N N 
the constraint E aij
a
i � E Bij
a
i. Note that the allocation. i=l i=l N 
aij = Bij = � i, j = 1, • • •  , N which maximizes E Ej rr alsoj=l 
the first order conditions for any j, given that pi and qi
(*) 
(**) i,j = l, . • • • ,N. 
satisfies 
satisfy 
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1. For a discussion of the legal principles involved under the 
riparian and appropriative doctrines, see Dewsnut. 
2. Struckmeyer and Butler cite a case in which use of water during 
the off-season to flood gophers from their holes was not deemed 
"beneficial consumptive use." Furthermore, some court decisions 
have specified maximum amounts of water usage per irrigated acre 
that qualify as "beneficial consumptive use." On the other hand, 
a large unnamed western irrigation district loses from 150,000 to 
500,000 acre-feet of water yearly due to seepage in an unlined 
diversion canal, a method of use which could be considered 
wasteful. As this amount is included in its rights total, should 
it decide to line the canal, it could use the salvaged water. 
3. For example, in 1974, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern 
California was able to transfer a portion of its rights to Colorado 
River water to the Southern California Edison Company, but only 
after the passage of enabling legislation by t he California State 
Legislature, as Southern California Edison intended to use 
this water outside of the geographic limits of the MWD .  
4. For example, many existing statutes allow for revisions in priority 
in times of drought. As a conse.quence, junior domestic and 
municipal or industrial users might be satisfied prior to senior 
agricultural users although not without compensation. We ignore 
this complication in ou� analysis. The relevance of this point 
arises in conjunction with the recent western drought and the 
prediction of lower long term water availability (for example, 
as suggested from the tree ring studies performed by the
Lake Powell Research Group relative to the Colorado River).
It is difficult to assess the importance of these matters, at
least in the case of the Colorado River, as large accumulations 
of stored water and the Bureau of Reclamation's implicit policy 
of releasing enough water to satisfy all downstream users (which in
total are limited to mean stream flow) suggest that it will be quite
a while until such constraints become effective. The authors 
explore these questions to some.extent in Burness and Quirk (1977).
5. We assume. f(x) > 0 for x > O, f(x) 
F(x) Jx f(c)dc, we have F(O) 
0 
0 for x < O. Letting 
0 and lim F(x) 1.
x+oo 
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6. Generally, the presence of charges do not affect the results, hence 
the simpler formulation; note that delivery charges are incorporated 
into the costs of constructing and maintaining diversion facilities. 
7. Proposition 3 generalizes even for nonidentical risk-averse 
expected utility maximizers facing diverse technologies. To see
this observe that the last appropriator must be of noninfinitesmal 
size else the dominance of increasing returns for small
diversion �apacity is violated. Given this, complete appropriation 
of the river implies that the costs of constructing diversion 
capacity be negative at some level, a clear impossibility (see 
Appendix A. l).
8, Proposition 4 generalizes as well. Note, however, that with 
diverse technologies, at the optimum water is prorated among firms 
according to their productivity so the expected marginal 
profitability is zero across firms, a condition that implies 
equal sharing if firms are identical. 
9. Should the eventuality of resale of water rights be foreseen,
one might question the determinacy at the investment vector
(a1, , • •  , aN): what prevents a senior appropriator from
"over-appropriating" for possible future resale? Fortunately. 
this poses no problem as the appropriative doctrine is clear 
on this matter: to obtain a right to water it must be 
diverted, and diversions are limited to beneficial consumptive 
use. However in practice this tnay be problematic (see footnote 
2). 
10. Proposition 5 generalizes in the same manner as Proposition 4. 
11. Proposition 6 relies heavily on separability of the profit
function. Although the proof is less direct the result generalizes 
for diverse technologies (maintaining the separability assumption)
but not for risk-averters. 
12. This result generalizes directly for diverse technologies d.nd 
risk-averse expected utility maximizers. 
13. Although Proposition 7 is instructive, one would not expect it
to be operational in the real world because of spatial monopolies
in the diversion leasing industry. 
14. See Burness and Quirk (1977) for a simplified treatment of the 
problem of reservoir management under the appropriative system.
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